14:24:48 <hyc> not honoring license is actionable
14:25:16 <hyc> people need to understand that "open source" doesn't mean public domain, you can't just do whatever the hell you want.
14:26:11 <hyc> and we should all be moving away from "permissive" open source licenses. GPL only.
14:26:35 <hyc> permissive just means "I can exploit your work and your community can fuck off"
14:26:38 <selsta> hyc: they rewrote it in Go but had the same comments as our code lol
14:27:12 <hyc> sheesh
14:27:14 <selsta> so it was an obvious copy
14:27:55 <hyc> well, rewriting in another language ... isn't purely mechanical, took at least some thought.
14:28:05 <hyc> so derivative but not copy/paste
14:28:23 <hyc> but still, yes, owes attribution
14:29:16 <selsta> they claimed their version is 10x faster, scammy all around :D
14:29:27 <hyc> bleah
14:46:16 <cjd> ouch
14:49:20 <sech1> selsta who claimed?
14:49:45 <selsta> Dero claimed the bulletproof implementation is 10x faster but this was year(s) ago
14:50:10 <selsta> someone just brought Dero up for having a new CPU mineable algorithm
14:53:41 <selsta> Anyone following the BCH 12.5% dev tax drama?
14:53:59 <selsta> Shows again why ASIC resistance is important.
14:55:09 <cjd> BWT does not seem like it would be resistant to GPU implementations
14:55:20 <hyc> saw the dev tax thing, what's it got to do with the PoW algo?
15:00:28 <selsta> The hashrate appears to be centralized to a few Chinese ASIC pools.
22:12:41 <koe> can you leverage PoW to detect MitM for active communication channels? basically it can force the attacker to conduct two parallel conversations, since if both honest actors expect each message packet to be delayed by ~N, the attacker can't intercept a packet from A, modify it, and send it to B, then receive the response, modify it, and send to A,
22:12:42 <koe> in 2N time. Use onion encryption so the message actually bounces back and forth between senders before being opened, with PoW between each bounce. Even if the attacker has infinite hash speed, they must conform to delays expected by each actor.
22:14:01 <koe> My question is, can parallel conversations be used to identify MitM?
22:15:53 <koe> well if it's just timing idk if PoW matters
22:30:09 <koe> nvm seems like the attacker can just alternate fake and altered messages, making the actual communication slower but avoiding parallel real convos