00:37:53 <fluffydonkey[m]> Does the trezor company delete personal/shipping info after some time? I'm afraid of what happened with Ledger
00:39:08 <as2333> fluffydonkey[m], nothing is ever deleted. It all goes to the govcorp datacenter
00:41:28 <fluffydonkey[m]> I'm okay with gov't knowing I bought a Trezor, I don't want 1337 h4X0rs knowing I have one
00:41:55 <fluffydonkey[m]> I mean, I'm not okay wuith them knowing, but I don't care in this case
00:43:13 <louipc> did all the ledgers get seized or what
00:43:47 <fluffydonkey[m]> Their customer data got hacked from their website. Now all those people get phished constantly
00:44:01 <phone[m]> <fluffydonkey[m] "Their customer data got hacked f"> fairly easy to avoid
00:44:47 <fluffydonkey[m]> getting your website hacked? You'd think so
00:47:02 <phone[m]> <fluffydonkey[m] "getting your website hacked? You"> avoiding a phish
03:38:11 <nvlcrkqhlidi> When Tari finally comes out, will you dump your Monero to buy it? Will others?
03:45:47 <apotheon> moneromooo: It still says it requires JavaScript to work, even when client-side scripting is turned on, by the way.
09:17:45 <moneromooo> apotheon: quite a feat, that. I'd normally say it's a cache thing, but a CGI ought not be cached...
09:17:55 <moneromooo> I dunno, clear your cache ?
09:18:26 <moneromooo> If it still does, be more precise about what is saying so, how in what wording.
10:35:06 <ovfytsugixj> Why are you here? For the tech? Then you should be off at Zcash instead of trying to con newbies into a coin that doesn't work. For the money? If you put your money in BTC or ETH you would have been better off. For the magical crypto friends? Monero leadership laughs from losers like that. Find yourself more healthy realationships that don't laugh at you when they steal your money.
10:36:14 <mmxxx[m]> https://open.lbry.com/@MoneroTalk:8/richard-stallman-on-cash-and-monero:b?r=AYTVDx49V72vyEcYV2JMwb6VevUoL5TS
11:34:52 <Mochi101> Did you do that in Perl moneromooo ?
11:37:34 <moneromooo> No.
11:38:05 <Mochi101> Too old school?
11:38:14 <moneromooo> No.
11:38:56 <moneromooo> I'm just a C person.
11:39:05 <Mochi101> IC
13:20:13 <SerHack> <3 C
13:47:13 <lord_fomo[m]> sweetwater eh
13:55:44 <xrv0[m]> Are subaddresses "scalable"?
13:55:57 <xrv0[m]> Can I create hundreds of them without causing issues?
13:57:18 <Mochi101> xrv0[m], only if by hundreds you mean hundreds of thousands
13:58:06 <xrv0[m]> I want to assign each user a subaddress
13:58:12 <xrv0[m]> Does it increase scanning time?
13:58:57 <selsta> no
13:59:21 <selsta> it takes some time to initially create them but should not noticeably increase scan time
13:59:25 <Mochi101> Something something 200 address look-ahead something something
14:01:55 <Mochi101> I wish that I had enough knowledge to explain better.
14:06:52 <moneromooo> Subaddresses are deterministically generated (the bit that takes a bit of time) and stored in a lookup table.
14:07:32 <moneromooo> Scanning looks up that table to see if an output from a tx is to your wallet (ie, to one of the subaddresses in your wallet, or your main address).
14:08:30 <moneromooo> So looking up a result in a lookup table of size 1 (a wallet witohut any subaddresses) or in a lookup table of size 100000 is pretty much the same speed. Cache miss effects are dwarfed by the crypto ops.
14:09:19 <moneromooo> What Mochi101 refers to is that if your wallet generated 1000 subaddresses, that'll be the contents of its lookup table: anything not in that table will be ignored by your wallet.
14:09:47 <moneromooo> So if a customer sends you monero to a subaddress not in the lookup table, you will miss it.
14:09:57 <moneromooo> That normally does not happen, but could happen if:
14:10:04 <moneromooo> - your wallet generates subaddresses
14:10:40 <moneromooo> - your wallet/OS/computer crashes, causing the new subaddresses to not be saved to the wallet cache (or you restore the wallet cache from a backup and do not recreate those subadddresses)
14:11:16 <moneromooo> If you end up in this case, the fix is to rescan after adding those missing subaddresses (they're deterministic so you'll be regenerating the same ones, so no actual loss).
14:11:51 <moneromooo> If you expect you'll be generating a lot of those subaddresses, you can set the lookahead to be a lot higher than the default, to mitigate that possibility.
14:12:18 <moneromooo> But you'll take some speed hit at generation time, and some extra RAM usage for the lookup table.
14:12:51 <moneromooo> IIRC something like 80 bytes per extra address. So... 80 MB for a million extra subaddresses.
14:13:15 <moneromooo> Those get saved so also an extra 80 MB to save to disk. Not much.
14:16:37 <Mochi101> Thanks moneromooo
14:34:34 <apotheon> moneromooo: browser is Vimb
14:34:47 <apotheon> moneromooo: https://apotheon.net/img/scripton.png
14:34:59 <apotheon> moneromooo: https://apotheon.net/img/scriptoff.png
14:35:45 <apotheon> moneromooo: I started a new instance of the browser, turned on scripting, and took a screenshot.
14:36:08 <Mochi101> apotheon, try it in a new private window
14:36:33 <Mochi101> Sometimes browser cache busting is impossible...
14:36:38 <selsta> it's the old URL
14:36:43 <selsta> moo posted a new one
14:37:56 <Mochi101> selsta is a sroller :)
14:38:02 <Mochi101> scroller
14:38:24 <Mochi101> oh no... just an observant reader
14:38:39 <Mochi101> I didn't even look that far down
14:39:36 <apotheon> selsta: Oh, I missed the new address being shared.  Oops.
14:39:53 <selsta> https://townforge.net/cgi-bin/choose_pool
14:39:57 <selsta> https://townforge.net/cgi-bin/choose_pool?raw
14:40:40 <apotheon> It's still a bit weird that with scripting turned on it complains about it (but still gives me a result).
14:40:58 <apotheon> . . . but I guess it's not very relevant if it's not the up-to-date script.
14:41:26 <moneromooo> The previous one was removed, so it's definitely caching.
14:41:45 <apotheon> weird
14:42:03 <apotheon> I even tried a cache refresh on a new instance.
14:42:14 <apotheon> I . . . hate what the big browser makers have done to us.
14:42:19 <moneromooo> Oh wait
14:42:50 <apotheon> I like that "raw" option.
14:42:57 * apotheon waits.
14:43:01 <moneromooo> Yeah, I'm a dunce, it was not removed from the html directory, sorry :)
14:43:11 <apotheon> no biggie
14:43:15 <apotheon> This was a fun adventure.
14:43:32 <apotheon> I'm glad I could help you figure out it hadn't been removed.
14:43:39 <moneromooo> ty :)
14:43:42 <apotheon> welcome
15:17:47 <xrv0[m]> <moneromooo "If you expect you'll be generati"> Thanks for the thorough explanation. I'll make sure to increase the lookahead
15:18:36 <xrv0[m]> Storage shouldn't be an issue
16:17:32 <MoneroLover> i have an interesting topic that's bothering me for few days
16:18:13 <MoneroLover> are there any guarantee
16:18:38 <MoneroLover> that increase in monero number of transactions are created by xmrflood?
16:18:42 <MoneroLover> and should we do it
16:18:44 <MoneroLover> on purpose
16:18:48 <MoneroLover> to make attacker
16:18:53 <MoneroLover> % of daily transactions lower
16:19:15 <MoneroLover> are not created by xmrflood*
16:19:27 <MoneroLover> the more outputs there are
16:19:38 <MoneroLover> and more decoys there are
16:20:53 <MoneroLover> transactions fees are pretty low, making this attack viable right now
16:24:37 <rupee[m]> it also causes the blockchain to be bigger. forever.
16:25:45 <MoneroLover> tx fees for whole daily volume are around 1500 usd if I did good math
16:27:23 <MoneroLover> i know people who would pay more to get their monero transactions more private
16:27:39 <MoneroLover> would that be a solution? spamming the blockchain or play passive?
16:28:36 <MoneroLover> maybe chainalysis is already using this method against us?
16:29:06 <MoneroLover> if one input, create two outputs for 1 tx fee
16:29:49 <MoneroLover> that's 1 + 2 * 2 ^ n outputs for 2 ^ n fees
16:30:53 <MoneroLover> should I shut up?
16:31:58 <MoneroLover> ok so today we are at 2 ^ 15 daily transactions
16:32:12 <MoneroLover> means 2 ^ 14 fees
16:33:46 <rupee[m]> it's not a cost issue. if the idea is good, we can easily raise funding to spam the hell out of the blockchain. The problem is that we don't really want a multi-terabyte blockchain, especially not in these early days before there is mass adoption.
16:34:26 <MoneroLover> i understand, but I am affraid someone is doing it already?
16:34:32 <MoneroLover> and it's not the monero lover
16:35:23 <rupee[m]> right. I've thought about this quite a bit as well. I assume there is a good chance that someone is doing that to try to unmask which outputs are decoys. But, if more than one entity is doing it, it greatly reduces the results they get.
16:36:05 <MoneroLover> does it also means that monero mixers in low volume ( not to flood the blockchain )
16:36:16 <MoneroLover> actually might be usefull
16:36:16 <rupee[m]> I think the monero research lab has probably looked into this and might have better statistics than my guesses.
16:36:20 <MoneroLover> ?
16:36:49 <rupee[m]> what is a monero mixer?
16:37:19 <MoneroLover> that would be when you send monero 3-4-5-6 times
16:37:33 <rupee[m]> ah, churning.
16:37:41 <MoneroLover> or I send you monero and you send me another monero
16:38:20 <MoneroLover> exchanges seems like big weak point in probabilist terms
16:38:30 <MoneroLover> if you are just once or two times
16:38:31 <MoneroLover> sending
16:38:39 <MoneroLover> monero -> another address -> exchange
16:38:40 <rupee[m]> in terms of blockchain size growth, it's one thing for users to churn their transactions a few times. It's another to build a program that intentionally creates spam.
16:39:40 <MoneroLover> it's mostly game of probability, nothing is cetain in monero transactions
16:39:51 <MoneroLover> but if we can assume
16:40:04 <MoneroLover> attacker make 50% of transactions everyday
16:40:12 <MoneroLover> if we make just 25% on top
16:40:20 <MoneroLover> his probabilites would suck much harder
16:40:23 <nioc> I am not concerned
16:40:57 <nioc> probably doesn't matter now anyway .................
16:40:59 <nioc> https://twitter.com/MoneroSpace/status/1377660627716603907
16:42:55 <MoneroLover> the thing it's crazy cheap to make such attack
16:42:58 <MoneroLover> and that we should
16:43:06 <MoneroLover> send monero as many times
16:43:07 <MoneroLover> as possible
16:43:21 <MoneroLover> to make outputs pool larger
16:44:51 <nioc> why would you want to make it as large as possible when that isn't necessary?
16:45:20 <MoneroLover> how it's not necessary?
16:45:45 <MoneroLover> whole decoy idea is based on outputs bro
16:46:23 <nioc> is it necessary to make it as large as possible when smaller would do the same thing?
16:46:47 <nioc> if it is even needed
16:47:04 <MoneroLover> if you considering all ouputs are honest, then makes no difference
16:47:11 <MoneroLover> if you have 100 or 18 million
16:47:23 <MoneroLover> but if you have 50% rogue outputs
16:47:27 <nioc> if
16:47:45 <MoneroLover> i am saying it's dirty cheap to make it happen
16:47:54 <MoneroLover> don't see why wouldn't then
16:48:16 <nioc> it is cheap only in one aspect
16:48:44 <MoneroLover> it's an open discussion, i am listening
16:49:01 <MoneroLover> monero saves my ass everyday
16:49:57 <MoneroLover> just want to make sure cat in this game is not running in front of us
16:50:25 <pgibpillssy> All you are 'fighting' for is e-penis of a guy you never met, that doesn't even have common decency to pay you for your time.
16:50:26 <pgibpillssy> Do you think they care about Monero, or privacy or anything other than money?
16:50:57 <Mochi101> The e-penis is mine!
16:51:09 <MoneroLover> i wish something bad happen to everyone who spread this fud
16:51:12 <MoneroLover> haha
16:52:34 <MoneroLover> 2 ^ 15 transactions
16:52:49 <MoneroLover> even following 20 minutes wait time
16:53:02 <MoneroLover> can be made within 5 hours
16:53:18 <MoneroLover> (2 ^ 3 ) ^ 5
16:57:39 <MoneroLover> is there someone I can talk to from research lab?
16:57:50 <MoneroLover> to try to make this happen w/e breaking something
16:58:34 <rupee[m]> there is a monero-research-lab channel on IRC and matrix
17:00:18 <MoneroLover> the thing to motivate us all
17:00:30 <MoneroLover> once there is big amount of fud around something
17:00:40 <MoneroLover> means it's doing great job
17:00:47 <MoneroLover> and always motivate me
17:01:01 <MoneroLover> to keep doing even better, no stop, full on
17:01:49 <apotheon> I'd definitely love to do a lot of business with Monero if I had good ways to do so.
17:02:09 <apotheon> As is, I'll just have to keep an eye out for the occasional opportunity that may come up.
17:04:31 <rupee[m]> i don't think it would do much good to only spam for 5 hours and then stop. You'd need it to go on continuously. Although the dollar cost may be low today, it would bring the long term scaleability problem closer to the present time. It would increase the storage costs for every node operator in the future. And, I think you'll find that the attack you're trying to fight against is a very hard attack to pull off because the
17:04:32 <rupee[m]> attacker needs to make up the majority of the transactions. i.e. if there is more than one attacker, it won't work for either of them.
17:05:21 <rupee[m]> but the MRL folks will know more than me about it
17:05:59 <apotheon> Yeah, a spam-attack as a means of securing the blockchain seems like a bad solution, at first glance.
17:06:37 <apotheon> I'm also skeptical that anyone with the resources to pull it off would already be trying to launch an attack like that in earnest.
17:06:38 <MoneroLover> No doubt, from our perspective it's bad for  network health / blockhain size
17:07:04 <MoneroLover> Actually I would have enough funds to lunch such attack
17:07:09 <MoneroLover> for year long timeframe
17:09:11 <MoneroLover> the best thing would be
17:09:18 <MoneroLover> if we could create consensus
17:09:31 <MoneroLover> to everyone create 100 transactions daily
17:10:46 <MoneroLover> or try cat and mouse approach
17:11:03 <MoneroLover> we create extra 10-20% daily transactions
17:11:04 <MoneroLover> for one day
17:11:15 <MoneroLover> if the network transactions also follows
17:11:20 <rupee[m]> why though?
17:11:23 <MoneroLover> with extra 10-20%
17:11:34 <MoneroLover> means somone is trying to follow up
17:13:04 <rupee[m]> First, show us that an attack like this is possible and damaging. Then we can think about how to fight back against it.
17:13:17 <nioc> yes this was covered in MRL a while ago and the BL was no need for us to spam the blockchain
17:16:52 <MoneroLover> ok, i will start preparation in couple of next days
17:19:40 <lord_fomo[m]> mmxxx: that stallman vid is cute
17:19:51 <lord_fomo[m]> pretty clear he knows shit all about crypto $
17:20:04 <lord_fomo[m]> but also makes some good points about xmr not solving the wealth divide problem
17:20:11 <lord_fomo[m]> which i think is a fair note
17:25:04 <mmxxx[m]> <lord_fomo[m] "pretty clear he knows shit all a"> he doesn't hide his ignorance
17:25:15 <lord_fomo[m]> agreed
17:25:24 <lord_fomo[m]> but it's still a bullet
17:26:34 * lord_fomo[m]  < https://matrix.org/_matrix/media/r0/download/matrix.org/NvznHgtKoPRCoPjssVqQKLwr/message.txt >
17:28:00 <lord_fomo[m]> oh and,
17:28:00 <lord_fomo[m]> - stallman clearly doesn't have a general definition for "freedom"
17:28:18 <lord_fomo[m]> which, is fair since it's a pretty hard thing to define
17:33:33 <MoneroLover> i see a lot of host blocked in my monerod
17:33:43 <MoneroLover> are those poison nodes?
17:33:56 <MoneroLover> they are all from similar ip range
17:34:22 <selsta> you can run with --enable-dns-blocklist so that all of these malicious nodes are blocked
17:34:29 <selsta> but monerod will run fine without it
17:36:59 <MoneroLover> how are they detected as malicious?
17:37:14 <MoneroLover> and thanks for help
17:37:18 <MoneroLover> i see from time to time
17:37:27 <MoneroLover> SYNC OK
17:37:35 <MoneroLover> but is it all time synced?
17:38:20 <xrv0[m]> There is a central dns for known malicious nodes
17:42:24 <MoneroLover> is it possible to fetch the whole list somehow?
17:45:31 * sethsimmons  < https://matrix.org/_matrix/media/r0/download/matrix.org/WRyffPJqJhcuBZmcgiKXsDji/message.txt >
17:50:53 <selsta> MoneroLover: https://gui.xmr.pm/files/block.txt
17:52:07 <MoneroLover> thanks bud, I see on github blocklist.moneropulse.*, but couldn't query it myself
17:52:12 <MoneroLover> and yeah it's those nodes
17:57:28 <selsta> how are they detected? different methods
17:57:41 <selsta> too lazy to explain :D some of them would fake their block height
17:57:49 <selsta> e.g. always mirror your own
18:09:37 <sethsimmons> MoneroLover: Some of my notes on a flooding attack, should be interesting: https://paste.debian.net/1192024/
18:13:43 <MoneroLover> just went trought your blog and thanks
18:14:00 <sethsimmons> np 🙂
18:15:50 <MoneroLover> oh it's on floodxmr, sorry was talking about poison attack
18:15:58 <MoneroLover> and yeah
18:16:06 <sethsimmons> Some overlap, but yeah
18:16:07 <MoneroLover> the thing is attack is pretty cheap
18:16:36 <sethsimmons> Not to be effective, and will be massively more difficult after Triptych ring size increase.
18:16:50 <sethsimmons> But it's certainly an attack vector at-present.
18:17:26 <MoneroLover> I couldn't sleep last few night doing math over it
18:27:10 <MoneroLover> and yes, mostly agree with everything
18:27:44 <MoneroLover> the dangerous is that if it's running now
18:27:51 <MoneroLover> without increase fee cost
18:28:00 <MoneroLover> in long-term
18:28:09 <MoneroLover> i've made a prototype
18:28:20 <MoneroLover> of halving transactions
18:28:30 <MoneroLover> that will implement in next days
18:28:56 <MoneroLover> 1 XMR -> - 1 TX fee -> divide by two and spend
18:29:12 <imgoogle[m]> niggers
18:29:16 <MoneroLover> and do that recursive
18:29:57 <selsta> MoneroLover: we don't want to spam our chain
18:30:33 <selsta> there has been increased adoption on the darknet and also increased crypto hype
18:30:44 <sethsimmons> Yeah, fighting spam with spam is not a solution, I don't think.
18:30:44 <sethsimmons> Just hurts everyone present and future,
18:30:55 <MoneroLover> I see the trends
18:31:01 <MoneroLover> and came here to consult before any action
18:31:17 <selsta> i don't think the current tx numbers indicate a large flood tx attack
18:32:37 <selsta> though I also think fees are a bit too low
18:33:38 <MoneroLover> the fees are blessedly low
18:38:19 <MoneroLover> maybe I am paranoid
18:38:29 <MoneroLover> but i've put lost of trust and investments into monero
18:38:41 <MoneroLover> want to strong and to see trouble
18:38:49 <MoneroLover> from a miles in front
18:39:38 <MoneroLover> #whomindstrongmonero
18:40:51 <MoneroLover> lots for trust*
18:40:55 <MoneroLover> sry
18:42:16 <nioc> fees will most likely be going up 4x in the next major release
18:46:27 <sethsimmons> I'm ded: https://twitter.com/thestalwart/status/1377663935399276546?s=21
18:50:20 <apotheon> nioc: Why?
18:51:30 <apotheon> sethsimmons: Is that the Brussels party?
18:51:46 <apotheon> oh, wait, I was looking at the wrong link
18:52:09 <apotheon> sethsimmons: never mind, yours is about BTC, I guess
18:52:28 <sethsimmons> Yeah, was confused lol
18:53:11 <sethsimmons> <apotheon "nioc: Why?"> https://github.com/monero-project/research-lab/issues/70
18:53:17 <sethsimmons> I assume is what he's referring to
18:56:52 <apotheon> Ah, that makes sense.
18:57:30 <apotheon> sethsimmons: This is what I saw in my browser, having forgotten to open the link you shared: https://images0.persgroep.net/rcs/giN1yrqzzgGiT0G3860gTM28vQk/diocontent/201517838/_fitwidth/1240?appId=93a17a8fd81db0de025c8abd1cca1279&quality=0.9
18:58:23 <apotheon> There was an April Fools Day precipitated party in Brussels, and police used pepper spray, water cannons, and fucking cavalry charges to break it up.
18:59:37 <sethsimmons> wth...
19:00:05 <apotheon> The police assault on the crowd was ostensibly to enforce lockdowns, just a couple days (or thereabouts) after an announcement that the people in government who've been mandating lockdowns have a thirty-day deadline to prove their lockdown measures for the last year were legal at all in the first place.
19:01:15 <apotheon> Belgium's voting public likes to redefine "police violence" to mean "violence against the police", and it's common there for people to get angry at news outlets that report on unreasonable violence perpetrated by police because it supposedly undermines confidence in the police.
19:01:23 <apotheon> I don't recommend visiting Belgium.
19:02:50 <apotheon> "dangerous place to visit, somewhat safer to live there if you're a bucolic, white, landowning, bigoted police-statist"
19:03:12 <apotheon> . . . and no, that's not the opinion of a communist.  Belgium is just that screwed up.
19:03:34 <apotheon> So . . . that thing about Monero seems well-reasoned.  I hope it works out.
19:04:15 <nioc> sethsimmons: thx, was making lunch
19:18:23 <picoq[m]> Any thoughts on using Godex.io?
19:23:20 <MoneroLover> seems recently
19:23:50 <MoneroLover> if service is using onion service
19:23:53 <MoneroLover> it's not under some pressure from regulators
19:23:54 <MoneroLover> related to monero exchanges
19:26:38 <picoq[m]> Anyone know where Godex.io is based? Clearly not continental US.
19:30:47 <picoq[m]> Also, does it in fact use Onion?
19:43:29 <NonLoSo[m]> They do not run an onion address
19:43:51 <NonLoSo[m]> They are pretty good the only issue is fee can be high
19:45:35 <apotheon> I need to figure out how to set up Tor to refer to a monerod node, apparently.  I guess I can't just configure a wallet with monero-wallet-cli with all the necessary stuff to find that node.
19:45:39 <apotheon> Damn.
19:45:50 <apotheon> These are the cases where things get annoying for me.
19:47:02 <apotheon> I can find great documentation for connecting my wallet to Tor, but the connection from Tor to the node needs to be set up in Tor, apparently, and Tor documentation isn't written by people who give a shit about Monero, so . . . there's a big hole in my documentation needs, I guess.
19:47:11 <picoq[m]> I agree. I have been looking for "consumer-level" options. For Monero to be a store of value and ultimately an _actual currency,_ one has to be able to use it for something, which in turn requires being able to interact with it without being a developer. I feel the technical curve is what has hampered the market value.
19:47:33 <NonLoSo[m]> If you want to use tor for web browsing just use torbrowser. If you want to use tor for other types of traffic run WHONIX in a VM
19:47:57 <NonLoSo[m]> Do some reading on whonix its the easiest way and not that complicated
19:48:02 <sethsimmons> <apotheon "I need to figure out how to set "> Both my guides tell you how to run a Monero node with RPC over Tor:
19:48:24 <apotheon> I dunno about picoq[m], but I want to run a Tor daemon on an OpenBSD system, and connect to a remote monerod with monero-wallet-cli via Tor.
19:48:33 <sethsimmons> First uses Docker, second uses systemd
19:48:36 <apotheon> I'll eventually want to do something similar with i2pd, too.
19:49:01 <apotheon> I will be using neither Docker nor systemd.
19:49:15 <sethsimmons> Oh, you want torsocks for CLI wallet to remote daemon?
19:49:16 <apotheon> The only systemd that runs on OpenBSD is a joke program that randomly deletes shit.
19:49:27 <sethsimmons> Then modify accordingly.
19:49:31 <sethsimmons> Or just ignore it :)
19:49:47 <apotheon> I'd like to be able to do it without torsocks per se, but I might have to if I don't find something that clarifies what I need without torsocks.
19:50:06 <apotheon> sethsimmons: Where are your guides?  Maybe I can glean something useful from them.
19:50:07 <sethsimmons> <picoq[m] "I agree. I have been looking for"> What isn't consumer-level about the GUI, Monerujo, or Cake Wallet?
19:50:17 <sethsimmons> <apotheon "sethsimmons: Where are your guid"> Linked just above.
19:51:06 <picoq[m]> sethsimmons: GUI wallet is fine; it's the anonymity overlay
19:51:08 <apotheon> sethsimmons: I guess you're sending messages from Matrix, and maybe the Matrix gateway is eating parts of your messages.  I don't see the links.
19:51:17 <sethsimmons> <apotheon "I'd like to be able to do it wit"> Not sure how you will manage to connect to Tor without Tor or torsocks...
19:51:25 <sethsimmons> <apotheon "sethsimmons: I guess you're send"> https://sethsimmons.me/guides/run-a-monero-node/
19:51:30 <apotheon> thanks
19:51:53 <sethsimmons> <picoq[m] "sethsimmons: GUI wallet is fine;"> It's very simple to expose RPC over Tor, see both guides above
19:51:57 <apotheon> Oh, I've seen this website somewhere before.
19:52:02 <sethsimmons> Feather Wallet uses Tor nodes quite easily as well.
19:52:09 <sethsimmons> featherwallet.org
19:52:24 <sethsimmons> #feather on OFTC
19:53:54 <picoq[m]> sethsimmons: Yes, but I am at the more rudimentary level of trying to help more people understand the value of XMR and how to transact with it using full privacy / OpSec. The people I am concerned about don't know what Tor is, or a node.
19:54:05 <apotheon> Am I mistaken in assuming that using Tor to connect to a node that isn't a Tor hidden service should be pretty straightforward?
19:54:15 <picoq[m]> If it is ultimately impossible without technical setup, then so be it. Just trying not to lose optimism.
19:54:28 <sethsimmons> <picoq[m] "sethsimmons: Yes, but I am at th"> Then they probably shouldn't worry about Tor usage for Monero -- it's not necessary for almost all threat models.
19:54:46 <sethsimmons> <apotheon "Am I mistaken in assuming that u"> Yes, you just rely on exit nodes then.
19:54:54 <apotheon> That's what I figured.
19:55:32 <apotheon> I just don't want to discover that there's something wonky about assumptions with Monero protocols that makes that difficult, somehow.
19:55:47 <sethsimmons> <picoq[m] "sethsimmons: Yes, but I am at th"> Tor is absolutely not necessary, especially with the strong default privacy guarantees of Monero both on-chain and via Dandelion++ for TX propagation.
19:55:53 <sethsimmons> <apotheon "I just don't want to discover th"> Nope.
19:56:12 <apotheon> Maybe I'll use torsocks for this first effort, actually, just to get it working.  I'm mostly looking for a proof-of-concept for myself, regarding multiple wallet instances using different wallet software.
19:56:17 <sethsimmons> Tor support should exist and get easier, but is not necessary for most people and doesn't always help.
19:56:25 <apotheon> . . . for the same logical wallet.
19:57:16 <picoq[m]> You don't have any concern regarding probabilistic Monero tracing methods being sold to U.S. government (e.g., CipherTrace)?
19:57:18 <apotheon> I can understand if someone wants to get people set up with Monero wallets that aren't visibly Monero-related from the perspective of the ISP.
19:57:19 <sethsimmons> I intentionally left the Tor configuration optional in both guides as it's not useful to most people at this point, but I'll continue iterating to make it easier for those that need it for their personal threat model.
19:57:44 <sethsimmons> <picoq[m] "You don't have any concern regar"> No, and clearnet node usage isn't a big factor there anyways
19:58:04 <sethsimmons> Nothing interesting was sold to the gov as far as we can tell, and by their own CEOs admission
19:58:20 <sethsimmons> Just a nice GUI explorer and some guessing software based on existing research.
19:58:26 <apotheon> While most people's conscious threat models don't involve hiding the fact they're using Monero at all, I think maybe more people should consider that for the long term.
19:58:39 <sethsimmons> That is (to my knowledge) entirely dependent on on-chain data, not network data.
19:58:44 <sethsimmons> <apotheon "While most people's conscious th"> For sure.
19:59:11 <apotheon> That being the case, a clearnet connection to a remote monerod could be less than ideal.
20:00:30 <apotheon> Of course, if it's difficult to do well, that could also be less than ideal, so those of us willing to bang our heads against the problem should go to some effort to make it easier through documentation and scripting, if nothing else.
20:01:03 <anon_udxf6fdz[m]> Can anyone recommend a tor based monero mining pool?
20:01:09 <sethsimmons> Simply running your own node is more than sufficient for most advanced threat models.
20:01:25 <apotheon> As such, I kinda hope to maintain the motivation, and find the time, to figure this all out and document the shit out of it.
20:01:27 <sethsimmons> But those with more needs or not wanting to leak any Monero interactions can and should use Tor
20:01:42 <sethsimmons> <anon_udxf6fdz[m] "Can anyone recommend a tor based"> None native that I know of, but can mine over Tor with XMRig
20:01:43 <apotheon> (in a portable way, without assumptions about things like docker and/or systemd, for instance)
20:01:55 <apotheon> (though, of course, using Docker and systemd use cases is also important)
20:02:11 <sethsimmons> There isn't really a more portable way than Docker FWIW
20:02:30 <sethsimmons> That's the whole reason I chose it, it's platform-agnostic (in almost all cases)
20:02:31 <apotheon> Tell that to systems where existing Docker images manifestly do not run.
20:02:44 <sethsimmons> Nothing is perfectly portable lol
20:02:53 <apotheon> thus, my point
20:02:57 <sethsimmons> If you invent that let me know, though.
20:03:45 <apotheon> If you can do it with a Tor daemon and software only from the Monero project, you can make it more portable.
20:03:59 <picoq[m]> One noob question I hear is: does using a non-logging VPN add anything to use of Monero?
20:04:00 <apotheon> That's why I'm leaning toward that approach.
20:04:39 <apotheon> My guess is "only a little, and only if it's as non-logging as you think".
20:05:13 <apotheon> You're still using Someone Else's Computer as a key part of your privacy efforts, so there's always the trust issue.
20:05:35 <picoq[m]> I'm certainly not a developer; just an advocate. (That's not ideal for good advocacy, I know.)
20:05:46 <apotheon> Onion and garlic routing remove a fair bit of the need to trust someone.
20:06:54 <apotheon> I hope to eventually get my setup to the point where I'm using i2pd, but I suspect I can get partway to the understanding I need to make it work with i2pd by using Tor first, considering there's more documentation out there for Tor end user configuration than for I2P gateways.
20:07:17 <picoq[m]> With the things going on in the world and particularly the U.S., my other drive is to find ways to allow people to exchange XMR but then swap to stablecoin or what-have-you if they have no other way to put food on the table.
20:07:29 <apotheon> . . . but I'm not likely to get a chance to play around with the Tor effort again until Monday at this point.
20:08:30 <apotheon> picoq[m]: Depending on where you are in the world, maybe sideshift.ai is a way to swap cryptocurrencies.  Unfortunately, I think sideshift blocks the US, and I also think it uses cloudflare, which I find . . . troublesome.
20:09:03 <apotheon> Someone mentioned something else to me recently as a good way to do some swaps between XMR and others, but I forgot what it was already.  I need to find that again.
20:11:24 <apotheon> picoq[m]: Is a Tor Hidden Service exchange acceptable?  You could try the xmr.is hidden service.  I think this is it: http://qomjz74sbhbxvxk44bkwigzqihyeiconbvt2h5xqgwklmurfahtltjid.onion/
20:11:54 <apotheon> picoq[m]: Check everything against this list: https://www.reddit.com/r/monero/wiki/avoid
20:12:09 <apotheon> I don't think xmr.is is on the known-bad list.
20:12:56 <picoq[m]> Good suggestions. I appreciate that.
20:31:33 <apotheon> picoq[m]: I hope they work out for you.
20:31:49 <apotheon> picoq[m]: In the IRC channel, there's a reference to that avoid-list in the channel topic.
20:32:03 <apotheon> I have to keep reminding myself that people in Matrix may not see it.
20:32:46 <picoq[m]> The header on this room says don't use any exchange except HitBTC
20:33:07 <picoq[m]> But that is on the "avoid" list (https://www.reddit.com/r/monero/wiki/avoid#wiki_exchanges)
20:34:32 <apotheon> interesting
20:54:19 <sethsimmons> <picoq[m] "The header on this room says don"> Read it again 😋
20:54:47 <picoq[m]> Did I misread it. Dang.
20:54:51 <picoq[m]> Or was it modified?
20:55:25 <sethsimmons> You misread it haha
20:55:40 <sethsimmons> Its long been on the avoid list
20:55:45 <sethsimmons> Like, very ling
20:55:51 <sethsimmons> * Like, very long
21:45:55 <strike> .usd
22:02:08 <rupee[m]> no monerobux in here